Dialogue against wars as the most powerful weapon

Dialogue against wars as the most powerful weapon

Looking at the panorama of a piecemeal Third World War (a term coined in 2014 by Pope Francis), a different awareness is needed among all populations.
It was Pope Francis himself who spoke extensively about peace, but with a completely different approach from what we see today. For him, the two pillars he often reiterated were universal brotherhood and dialogue.
For him, peace was not merely the absence of war, but a path built day by day, “artisanally,” made up of concrete gestures of respect and encounter. He repeatedly said that no one saves themselves alone and that people need to recognize each other as members of the same human family.
In his encyclicals and public speeches, he insisted that peace arises from social justice, from attention to the poor, and from efforts to overcome inequalities. Dialogue, even with those who think differently or belong to other religions, for him was not a political strategy, but a choice of humanity: it is the only way to defuse conflicts before they turn violent.
An expression he often used was the “culture of encounter,” as opposed to the “throwaway culture” or culture of conflict. In this context, brotherhood is not a poetic term, but the basis for real coexistence between peoples and religions.
Unfortunately, even today, and perhaps more than ever before, we witness too much exploitation, pressure from the left or right, and vile profiteering over these human tragedies, which risk further fomenting these wars instead of defusing them.
We often observe angry attitudes among individuals and populations (which may be understandable given the emotionality associated with these scenarios), but which, too, are the opposite and an oxymoron for achieving peace between peoples and the concept of Peace proclaimed by Pope Francis.
Let us immediately clarify (to avoid further exploitation and ideological profiteering) that the instigators of war deserve nothing less than an unmitigated conviction. Leaders who arm, finance, and drag entire populations into the fires of hatred are the true executioners of our time. It doesn’t matter from which capital they order attacks or from which weapons factory the bullets emerge: the result is always the same—cities reduced to rubble, families torn apart, entire generations shattered.
And yet, while the powerful make decisions, the people cry out in another language: that of dialogue. From mothers mourning their children in Gaza and Khartoum, to young people who no longer wish to take up arms in Ukraine or Myanmar, a voice rises that knows no bounds. It is the voice of those who demand: “Talk to each other before you shoot each other.”
Imagine if before every bomb there had been a round table discussion among villages, associations, religions, and ordinary citizens. Imagine if the microphones of diplomacy had been handed over not to generals but to markets, schools, and public squares. Perhaps those same public squares today would not be covered with rubble but with white flags.
This is the unspoken scandal: war does not arise between peoples, but between the interests of the powerful. And if that’s the case, then the cure is to overturn the order—before taking sides, with flags or otherwise, before counting the dead, we need a dialogue that precedes every stance. Not “Who are you on?”, but “How can we save ourselves together?”
The world needs a moral shock. Not a new arsenal, but a new language. Not an arms race, but a race for confrontation. And this race must begin now, because the time we waste making excuses is time others lose their lives.
Peace cannot wait for the powerful to be convinced. Peace must explode from below. And the only question that remains unanswered is: will we have the courage to shout it louder than the bombs?
Now, to better understand the scenario we are immersed in, especially us serene and calm men and women of the West, let’s do a more in-depth analysis of what planet Earth will be like in 2025.
General overview of global suppliers –
The main arms exporters in recent times remain the United States, France, Russia, China, and Germany; Many conflict-relevant supplies come from these countries directly or through national intermediaries/companies. (Source: SIPRI – Trends in international arms transfers, 2024)
1) War in Ukraine
Main arms suppliers to Ukraine
– United States: largest share of arms supplies to Kyiv (artillery, MLRS rockets, anti-aircraft systems, ammunition, HIMARS, tanks, etc.).
– European Union, with individual European states (Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway): artillery, ammunition, armored vehicles, air defense systems, and logistical assistance.
Suppliers/support for Russia (direct or indirect)
– Russian military industry (domestic supply).
Core of the accusation of clandestine supplies: North Korea—reported by intelligence and reports as a massive operational-level supplier of ammunition; journalistic investigations and official notices state that Pyongyang has supplied large-scale ammunition to Russia.
– Iran: supplies of kamikaze drones (Shahed and similar) and missiles to support Russian forces; repeatedly reported by Ukrainian authorities and international investigations.
Note on systems types: Long-range artillery and ammunition are the critical factor — many Western nations have supplied large quantities of systems and ammunition, while Russia has integrated external supplies (NK ammunition, Iranian drones).
2) Gaza War — Israel
Main Arms Suppliers to Israel
– United States: main supplier (aircraft, ammunition, intelligence, air defense systems such as Iron Dome/Patriot; historically largest economic and military assistance).
– Other European suppliers (Germany, Italy, etc.) provide components, ammunition, and systems. However, some countries have suspended or limited shipments due to legal/human rights concerns (e.g., Canada, the Netherlands have halted civilian/special shipments).
Suppliers/Support to Palestinian Groups
– Iran — listed as a key supplier of weapons and resources (financial, technical, training) to Hamas and affiliated groups and regional partners (Hezbollah); channels and transfers include rockets, anti-tank systems, and know-how.
– Hezbollah (Lebanon) and other regional networks have provided political/military support; part of the arsenal arrives via the so-called Iran-backed “Axis.”
Type: Short/medium-range systems (rockets, rocket launchers, drones), in addition to financial/organizational support; many weapons arrive through clandestine channels or third countries.
3) Civil War in Sudan (SAF vs. RSF)
Who supplies weapons and who supports them
– RSF (Rapid Support Forces): Investigations and reports (Reuters, UN, NGOs) have highlighted a suspicious “air bridge” with flights originating from the United Arab Emirates — analysis of flights and weapons finds suggest deliveries of military equipment that have strengthened the RSF. Amnesty International and investigations also document weapons of Chinese origin/supplies via intermediaries.
– Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Historically have diplomatic/military relations with Russia; The Wagner Group’s role and its ties in Sudan have been repeatedly reported (prior to the alignment shifts), and Moscow has shown a diplomatically favorable position towards the government in various UN elections.
– Interested regional actors / geopolitical support.
– United Arab Emirates (UAE): implicated—according to reports and some UN reports—in the logistics that played a role in supplying the RSF (counter-accusations and official denials exist).
– Russia (Wagner): Past ties with the RSF; Moscow also maintains relations with Sudanese state actors and is negotiating bases.
Type: Large quantities of small systems, vehicles, light artillery, and ammunition; transfers often use cargo flights and third-party routes.
4) Civil War in Yemen (Houthis vs. Government/Coalition)
Suppliers / Support
– Houthis (Ansar Allah): Widely reported support from Iran (supply of missiles, anti-ship systems, know-how for assembling drones and rockets). UN reports and press investigations document components, systems, and training linked to Tehran.
– Saudi Arabia-led coalition / Yemeni government: The US and the UK have been major suppliers (weapons, ammunition, intelligence support, and supplies). There have been rulings, controversies, and NGO complaints regarding the use of Western weapons in attacks that have caused civilian casualties.
Type: air weapons and ammunition for strikes (coalition), anti-ship/ballistic missiles, and drones for the rebels (Houthi).
5) Conflict in Myanmar
Supplier/support for the regime (junta)
– Russia and China are repeatedly cited (UN reports, Reuters) as primary sources or facilitators for the acquisition of weapons, spare parts, and technical assistance to the Burmese army (junta). Supplies may include aircraft, parts, land systems, and cash.
Type: heavy equipment, vehicle/aviation components, small arms, and financial/technical support; transfers partially hidden through intermediaries.
6) Conflicts in Ethiopia (including Amhara/Oromia/Tigray clashes)
Who supports and supplies
– Eritrea has historically supported the Ethiopian federal government at various times (supplying troops in the Tigray theater); analytical reporting sources and Reuters document armed interventions and logistical-military support.
– Arms supplies to the Ethiopian government may include purchases from various international suppliers (SIPRI data shows that major global suppliers sell to African states; specific transfers often appear through commercial contracts).
Type: Conventional weapons, armored vehicles, ammunition, and logistical support; regional borders and historical relationships make Eritrea’s influence (and sometimes external channels) a key issue.
Final considerations and limitations –
Unfortunately, due to journalistic and reporting difficulties in the territories and data and news cover-ups, transparency regarding these conflicts is limited; many supplies (especially to non-state groups) pass through intermediaries or civilian air routes; Journalistic investigations and UN reports are often the only source of attribution.
Regarding official exports, SIPRI remains the reference source for large-scale data on state exports; it shows that most “official” weapons come from a small group of exporters (USA, France, Russia, China, Germany).
More investigative evidence is needed; for each conflict, specific dossiers can be found (Reuters, Amnesty, UN Panel reports, SIPRI) that document specific deliveries.
Estimates of war casualties are obviously extremely uncertain; they vary enormously depending on the source, often mixing “direct” deaths (killed by weapons/attacks) and “indirect” deaths (hunger, disease, collapse of services), and systematic reporting is lacking for many theaters. The following figures are ranges of estimates derived from the most cited public sources (UN/UNICEF/ACLED/investigative reporters/SIPRI/etc.).
Furthermore, estimates of conflict-related deaths (total and—where possible—children and adults) are complex.
But let’s see, despite the considerations just made, what the most reliable estimates are for the various war events, with one figure, the most horrifying, being that children are victims of injustices they don’t even know about.
1) Ukraine (invasion 2022–present)
Total casualty estimate (range): ~60,000–150,000 deaths (overall estimate from various analyses/reports; higher estimates circulating in 2024–2025 increase uncertainty).
Children: Official data on child deaths are fragmentary; the UN and other organizations report an increase in child casualties, but there is currently no reliable, publicly available, consolidated count.
2) Gaza — conflict began October 7, 2023
Total casualty estimate (range): ~63,000 – 80,000 or more (government sources and international agencies report numbers in this range; some news updates and local health ministries give slightly different specific figures).
Children: UNICEF and other agencies repeatedly report tens of thousands of children killed or injured (UNICEF: “more than 50,000 children reported killed or injured” in various updates). News sources cite estimates of tens of thousands of child deaths in some local counts; however, many counts combine “killed and injured.” Reliable data on child deaths alone is not publicly available in a consolidated manner.
3) Sudan (conflict 2023–present)
Total casualty estimate (range): ~30,000 – 150,000 or more (estimates vary: ACLED and field organizations report tens of thousands of documented deaths; other sources—including some former UN officials—cite up to ~150,000 when indirect deaths and extrapolated estimates are included).
Children: There are dramatic estimates of child deaths related to hunger and the collapse of services (some sources cite hundreds of thousands of children affected by malnutrition), but a precise number of “child deaths” directly attributable to the conflict is not consolidated. Very high estimates should be noted (various sources speak of catastrophic impacts on child mortality), but with great uncertainty.
4) Yemen (2014–present)
Total estimated death toll (range): ~150,000 – 377,000 or more (a commonly cited estimate for the entire 2014–2021 period is ~377,000, including indirect casualties; the most recent figures speak of hundreds of thousands of total deaths when hunger and disease are included).
Children: UNICEF records more than 11,000 children killed or injured in recent years and reports hundreds of thousands of children affected by severe hunger; counts of children dying from direct/indirect causes vary and are difficult to separate.
5) Myanmar (internal conflict, escalation 2021–present)
Total casualty estimate (range): ~20,000 – 199,000 or more (some sources give a very high cumulative total; others report tens of thousands of documented casualties; great uncertainty).
Children: Attacks on schools and health facilities have caused many child casualties, but there is no consolidated public count of child deaths nationwide.
6) Ethiopia (various fronts: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, etc.)
Total casualty estimate (range): ~100,000 – 610,000 or more (reports and analyses vary widely: some studies and extrapolated estimates speak of hundreds of thousands; other sources document tens of thousands of recorded deaths).
Children: Extremely severe impact in terms of displacement, malnutrition, and access to health services, but reliable data on child deaths as a separate category are not always available.
The approximate aggregate (adding the ranges above) is as follows.
Sum of the minimum indicative estimates (only these conflicts listed): ~420,000 – 450,000 total deaths (sum of the lower estimates for each theater).
Sum of the maximum indicative estimates: ~1.5 – 1.6 million total deaths (sum of the upper estimates).
So, a very approximate aggregate range is ~0.4 – 1.6 million deaths. This range reflects the enormous methodological uncertainty between sources (differences between direct/indirect casualties, time periods considered, access to data).
How much can we separate children from adults?
For some theaters, we have relatively robust indicators, but they almost always combine “killed or injured” or talk about the impact on children (malnutrition, separation, violence). Examples:
Gaza: UNICEF reports >50,000 children killed or injured (the “killed or injured” figure, not just deaths). There are also journalistic estimates reporting tens of thousands of children killed in some local accounts, but these are not universally verified.
Yemen: UNICEF reports >11,000 children killed or injured and hundreds of thousands at risk of severe malnutrition.
Sudan, Ethiopia, Myanmar: Data on child deaths exist in local contexts and for individual events (school attacks, epidemics), but there is currently no public and consolidated dataset that allows us to reliably add up “child deaths” for these theaters in the same way as we estimate total casualties.
Conclusion on children: It is not possible to provide—in a responsible and verifiable manner—a precise aggregate number of “child deaths” for all the conflicts listed. We can say, however, that, unfortunately, children constitute a substantial share of victims in several theaters (especially Gaza, Yemen, Sudan) and that recognized or verified counts of child deaths/injuries are in the tens of thousands (with the possibility that the total number of child deaths, considering indirect deaths, could be much higher).
Conclusions
Looking at this scenario, it’s clear that peace cannot be reduced to a silence of arms imposed from above. Pope Francis reminded us that peace is a work of art, built daily with small gestures of dialogue and fraternity, and that without social justice it remains fragile and incomplete.
Today, however, we witness a paradox: while governments and warlords multiply supplies of weapons and military alliances, the populations—those who truly suffer the consequences—demand dialogue and mutual recognition. Not an abstraction, but the concreteness of schools, markets, and communities that can become spaces for encounter rather than targets.
In this context, street demonstrations reduced to “pro” or “anti” banners risk turning into further fronts of conflict, fueling divisions and anger instead of opening glimmers of dialogue. If the cry of the people is to emerge, then it cannot be the repetition of opposing slogans, but a unanimous demand for a new language capable of uniting.
The new approach to peace we need isn’t based on arsenals, but on civil courage: putting the voices of the people before the interests of the powerful, making the logic of “how can we save ourselves together” prevail over that of “which side are you on.” It means building a language that isn’t based on opposition, but on the search for what unites.
Only in this way will peace cease to be a deferred promise and become a shared present. The challenge is immense, but the question remains urgent: will we have the strength to choose dialogue as the most powerful weapon?

Guido Bisanti